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I magine: You are a well-positioned manager in a large I business. You supervise several other managers who I also have substantial responsibility. One of your sub ordinate managers, Sylvia, mentions that her daughter, Kate, who is a school classmate of your daughter, was just sent home from school with the flu. You encourage Sylvia to take time off until Kate can return to school. When it later becomes time for you to conduct Sylvia's annual performance review you have a problem because her above-average perfonnance falls just between levels that could justify your giving her an overall judgment of "meets expectations" or "exceeds expectations." You opt for "ex ceeds expectations," which ultimately helps Sylvia to qual ify for a promotion and a salary raise. Another employee, Robert, is equally above average. Robert's records show that he too missed several days of work, but you do not know him as well and do not know why he missed work. You give Robert a "meets expectations" evaluation, and he gets a smaller raise and no promotion.
It is not difficult to understand why you, in your managerial role, would resolve doubt more favorably for a supervisee with whom your daughter provides a personal connection. Theories to explain effects of such personal connections on social judgment have existed at least since Heider's (1958) analysis of interpersonal relations. Related explanations appear in more recent theoretical analyses of social identity (e.g.. Brewer, 1999; Gaertner et al., 1997; Greenwald et al., 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) .
If your favorable judgment of Sylvia's work perfor mance is understandable, then it is also understandable that many other types of connections between people-includ ing ones due to shared race, ethnicity, age, religion, or perhaps even just a shared birthday (Finch & Cialdini, 1989 )-can likewise result in tipping the balance toward a favorable judgment, giving "the benefit of the doubt." This role of ingroup connections in shaping favorable feelings, judgments, and actions underlies this article's thesis that ingroup-directed favoritism is, in the United States, a more potent engine for discriminatory impact than is outgroupdirected hostility.
Quite often ingroup favoritism is hidden even from those who practice it. Consider the way much job recruit ment occurs. Good workers are asked frequently to seek out others for job openings. Because of extensive racial segregation in residences, schools, and workplaces, this practice often leads White workers, drawing on virtually all-White acquaintanceship networks, to seek out only other Whites for job vacancies (Reskin, 1998; Rivera, 2012) . By drawing heavily on ingroup ties, this unremark able process can sustain or exacerbate racial or other im balances, entirely without involvement of hostility toward minorities. In qualitative studies of White workers, DiTomaso (2012) showed how such ingroup-enabled network ing affords increased access to job openings.
Prejudice, Hostility, Discrimination, ana Ingroup Favoritism
The Oxford English Dictionary defines prejudice as "dis like, hostility, or unjust behaviour deriving from precon ceived and unfounded opinions." 1 This definition, which links prejudice to both hostile intergroup attitude and dis criminatory behavior, fits well with scholarly scientific analyses. To confinn that this understanding of "prejudice" was not merely our own caricature of scientific treatments, we searched for authoritative definitions in published re-search on prejudice and also in well-regarded past and current social psychology texts that we found on our book shelves (see the Appendix). We retrieved 24 definitions, 18 of which explicitly connected prejudice to negative attitude or negative evaluation; four others identified prejudice with either positive or negative attitudes; the remaining two identified prejudice with emotional reactions without spec ifying the emotions' affective character.
Only two of the 24 definitions we retrieved included "discrimination" as part of the definition of prejudice. Following Gordon lead, social psycholo gists have long held that the connection of prejudicial attitude to discriminatory behavior is not something to be assumed but, rather, something that requires empirical demonstration. Complementing this scientific understand ing that the link between prejudicial attitude and discrim ination is not obligatory, legislators have likewise treated them as separable. With the exception of a few references to "hostile work environments," America's civil rights laws interpret discrimination in nonemotional tenns, making it illegal to treat people unequally "because of' race, skin color, sex, religion, national origin, age, or disability status. Civil rights laws do not take either hostility or negative prejudicial attitude to be a necessary feature of discrimina tion. Likewise, in this article, we hold that discrimination does not require hostility. Unequal treatment can be pro duced as readily (or, as we will conclude, more readily) by helping members of an advantaged group as by hanning members of a disadvantaged group.
The scientific study of prejudice has been pursued uninterruptedly since the introduction of the first measures of intergroup attitudes by Bogardus (1925) and Thurstone (1928) . In this (now) massive body of scientific work, one is unlikely to encounter completely new ideas. True to that expectation, this article's central thesis-that ingroup fa voritism is a prime cause of discrimination-is not new. The importance of ingroup favoritism in discrimination was described especially clearly by both S. L. Gaertner et al. (1997) and Brewer (1999) . S. L. Gaertner et al. (1997) wrote that "racial bias, particularly in its contemporary manifestations, may reflect a prowhite, not simply [the] antiblack sentiment that many traditional theories and mea sures have implied" (p. 175). Brewer (1999) wrote, "Ulti mately, many fonns of discrimination and bias may de velop not because outgroups are hated, but because positive emotions such as admiration, sympathy, and trust are re served for the ingroup and withheld from outgroups" (p. 438). In a review article, Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis (2002) carefully considered the interplay of ingroup favor itism and outgroup hostility as components of intergroup bias, in the process presaging several topics central to this article. More recently, Dixon, Levine, Reicher, and Durrheim (2012) asked, "Has the time come to challenge the assumption that negative evaluations are inevitably the cognitive and affective hallmarks of discrimination?" (p. 411). We proceed further in this direction, concluding that, at least in the United States, ingroup favoritism is the prime mechanism of discrimination. 2 Perhaps because the most dramatic fonns of discrim ination contain no hint of ingroup favoritism, statements such as those by S. L. Gaertner et al. (1997) and Brewer (1999) have not displaced the view that outgroup hostility is discrimination's primary antecedent. Studies collected for two meta-analyses confinn this observation. Among 1,351 individual tests of effects of intergroup contact on intergroup relations (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006 , 2011 , not even one employed a measure of ingroup favorability as a dependent variable. Likewise, among 370 tests ana lyzed by H. J. Smith, Pettigrew, Pippen, and Bialosiewicz (2012) to determine the effects of group relative deprivation on prejudice, only two used ingroup fa vorability as a dependent variable (Amiot, Terry, & Callan, 2007; Terry & O'Brien, 2001) . The only in group-related measures-used in a small minority of tests in these two meta-analyses-were measures of collective self-esteem and ingroup identification.
Consider, too, the Journal of Social Issues special issue in 2012 that focused on discrimination (Nier & Gaert ner, 2012b) . Several authors in that issue acknowledged that hostility is not a necessary precondition for discrimi nation. For example. Nier and Gaertner (2012a, p. 218) wrote, "In many cases, . . . discrimination is likely to be subtle and difficult to detect, and in some instances, may be unintentional." Nevertheless, throughout the special issue the dominant assumption was that, in most instances, hos tile prejudice is the wellspring of discrimination. And com mon throughout the research literatme are studies that show how hostile prejudice is linked to discriminatory intentions without regard for ingroup favorability (e.g., Wagner, Christ, & Pettigrew, 2008) .
In three steps, the remainder of this article builds a case for understanding ingroup favoritism as not just a cause but as the prime cause of American discrimination. First, we review findings supporting the two phenomena that are merged in this article's main thesis: the existence of strong positive dispositions toward ingroup members (i.e., ingroup favoritism) and evidence that discrimination oc curs more often as differential favoring than as differential hanning. Although both of these phenomena are thor oughly established empirically, the connection between them has received very little recognition. Second, we con sider theories that explain the psychological antecedents of favoritism. Third, we review research methods that have been used in studies of discrimination to understand why there are so few available direct tests of the link between ingroup favoritism and discrimination. In the concluding discussion, we reflect on implications of this article's in group favoritism thesis.
Findings: Favoring Ingroup Members

Similarity and Attraction
By me (1961) introduced а method for investigating attrac tion as a function of attitude similarity. In an initial session, experimenters obtained subjects' responses to 26 attitude questions. Two weeks later, the same subjects were asked to evaluate an otherwise unknown person for whom the only available information consisted of that person's re sponses to the same 26 questions. Unknown to subjects, the attitude responses of these "strangers" had been filled out by researchers so as to vary systematically, in four levels, ranging from exactly agreeing with all of the subjects' own responses to exactly disagreeing with all of them. Byrne's finding, which proved to be robustly replicable, was that liking and attraction toward the strangers were strongly a function of attitude similarity. In Byrne's (1961) report, across six dependent measures, effect sizes for the greater positivity of evaluations for most versus least similar strangers averaged a Cohen's d of 3.40, constituting a very large effect. As a reference point, Cohen (1977) described a d of 0.80 as a large effect. Subsequent studies showed that Byrne's similarity-attraction principle was not limited to effects of attitude similarities; it occurred equally for similarities in personality traits and similarities in behavior (e.g., Byme, Ervin, & Lamberti, 1970) .
Furthering Byrne's contentions, Rokeach proposed that the perception of conflicting beliefs and values triggers race prejudice more than does race itself (Rokeach, 1960; Rokeach & Mezei, 1966) . This is plausible if, as Rokeach supposed, outgroup members are typically assumed to har bor beliefs and values conflicting with those of the ingroup. Rokeach's position was initially controversial (see Stein, Hardyck, & Smith, 1965; Trianchs, 1961; Triandis & Davis, 1965) , but the controversy gradually disappeared. And, as already mentioned, by 1970 the similarity-attraction prin ciple had been extended beyond attitudes to other charac teristics (Byme et al., 1970) . Nevertheless, the effect of (especially) race similarity on interpersonal attitudes has continued to be of interest.
In work settings, evaluations have often been shown to be more favorable when the evaluator and evaluatee (e.g., a hiring manager and a job applicant) are similar, rather than different, in race or gender (e.g., Riordan, 2000) . Interpretation of this demographic similarity effect as a fonn of discriminatory bias has been made plausible by reports that the effect can be minimized or eliminated when highly structured interview methods are used (e.g., McCar thy, Van Iddekinge, & Campion, 2010; Sacco, Scheu, Ryan, & Schmitt, 2003) . Highly structured interviews are understood to minimize discriminatory effects because they leave little to the interviewer's subjectivity or discretion (e.g., Heilman & Haynes, 2008) . The interesting question as to whether effects of demographic similarity in the workplace are due to ingroup favoritism or outgroup hos tility has not been directly addressed in most of the avail able research. However, the (earlier mentioned) studies by DiTomaso (2012), Reskin (1998) , and Rivera (2012) are supportive of a favoritism interpretation. In sum, the simi larity-attraction principle is consistent with an expectation that attitudes toward members of one's own group (in group) will typically be more positive than attitudes toward members of other groups (outgroups).
The Minimal Group Paradigm (MGP)
More than 40 years after the discovery of minimal group paradigm (MGP) effects, the original report of that finding by Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971;  see also Tajfel, 1970) continues to shape research and theory on intergroup relations. Tajfel et al. found that even when subjects were assigned arbitrarily to groups in a laboratory study, they preferentially allocated resources to members of their own group rather than to those in another group. Later studies found that this occurred even when subjects knew that the basis for assigmnent was random. It also occurred when subjects did not know which of the other subjects who were present were members of their own group and which were members of the other group (Billig & Tajfel, 1973) . Platow and Van Knippenberg (2001) , using the MGP, showed that subjects expect and believe it is fair for an ingroup member to treat all ingroup members fairly. But they also tend to expect and believe it to be fair for an ingroup member to favor another ingroup member over an outgroup member. Not surprisingly, ingroup mem bers cannot be expected to identify their ingroup favoritism as discrimination when they see their behavior as legiti mate, nonnative, and even procedurally fair.
A further study by L. Gaertner and Insko (2001) showed that distributions of monetary payments in the MGP are party constrained by equity nonns-which pre scribe giving equal rewards to all. Nevertheless, these investigators also observed ingroup favoritism when the monetary distributions were described as bonus payments (making equity inelevant) and when subjects were asked to describe their feelings toward unspecified members of each group. Their article also introduced a new dependent mea sure fonnat ("multiple alternative matrices") that avoided a strict inverse relationship between outcomes of ingroup and outgroup members. This measure allowed the conclusion that, on average, subjects were more motivated by ingroup favoritism (higher payments to ingroup members) than by outgroup hostility (lower payments to outgroup members). In the context of similarity-attraction research, MGP re search indicates that similarity that is solely due to mem bership in the same group suffices to provide a basis for both attraction and favoritism, even when no specific attri butes are known to be shared with members of that (min imal) ingroup.
Ingroup and Outgroup Are Differentiated More as Targets of Positive Than of Negative Feelings
If negative outgroup attitudes are expressed primarily in hostile fonn, we can expect that negative emotions should be more readily expressed toward outgroups than in groups-a phenomenon that is indeed observed (cf. E. R. E. R. Smith & Mackie, 2005) . A rarely addressed empirical question (but cf. Dovidio, Mann, & Gaertner, 1989; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983 ) is how ingroup-outgroup differences in negative feelings compare to ingroup-outgroup differences in positive feelings.
A study of racial attitudes in the 2012 American presidential election (Ziegler, Kirby, Xu, & Greenwald, 2013) included data from more than 45,000 volunteers who responded to (among other measures) two measures of emotional responses to Black and White persons. One of these was a standard feeling thermometer, which in structed, "Please rate how wann or cold you feel toward White [or Black] people." We conducted a secondary anal ysis of these data, limited to Whites who expressed strong White preference and Blacks who expressed strong Black preference, to ensure a focus on Whites and Blacks who clearly perceived their own racial groups as "ingroups." For these participants, thennometer responses of strong wannth toward the ingroup exceeded expressions of strong cold feelings toward the outgroup by a ratio of approxi mately 4:1 for Whites and more than 50:1 for Blacks. That is, expressions of wannth toward the ingroup greatly ex ceeded expressions of coldness toward the outgroup.
The second emotion measure used by Ziegler et al. (2013) was an adaptation of Pettigrew and Meertens's (1995) measure of subtle racism. It consisted of two items asking "How often have you felt for African Amer icans who grew up in slums and poverty?" The blank was replaced by "sympathy" or "admiration" in the two items. The same items were also used to ask about "Americans" in place of "African Americans." Subjects of both races whose Likert-item responses stated very strong racial in group preference were more disposed to feel positively toward impoverished members of their own racial group than toward comparable members of the outgroup. 3 Similar findings with minor variants of the subtle racism items have emerged in European research. Petti grew and Meertens (1995; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997) found in seven independent samples from France, Ger many, Great Britain, and the Netherlands that these items correlated highly with other measures of prejudice. Al though the sympathy and admiration items are typically not seen by Europeans as reflecting prejudice, they neverthe less predicted pro-discrimination beliefs. For example, those who reported that they rarely or never felt sympathy or admiration for immigrants were significantly more likely to support expelling iimnigrants who have committed crimes or who have no immigration papers. These survey respondents are more appropriately described as withhold ing positive emotions (sympathy and admiration) from immigrants than as expressing hostile feelings toward im migrants.
Findings: Discrimination Often Occurs as Differential Favoring
Studies of intergroup behavior in field settings have exam ined the extent to which significant discriminatory effects result from differential helping or favoring. There are lim itations on conclusions from these studies that we will mention later. Nevertheless they are quite consistent in showing the potential for discrimination to result from differential favoring.
Helping Behavior
Experiments on unobtrusively observed helping of ingroup and outgroup members began with an ingenious study using a "wrong number" method devised by S. L. Gaertner and Bickman (1971) . Researchers, speaking with accents that were racially identifiable as Black or White, placed telephone calls in which they claimed to be stranded drivers calling an automobile mechanic and urgently needing help for their disabled cars. Because of strong residential seg regation in the Brooklyn, New York, neighborhoods to which those calls were directed, researchers could know whether the call recipients were racially White or Black. Claiming to have used his last coin in a pay phone, the caller asked the recipient to help by calling the mechanic to relay the emergency request for road service. The key finding: White call recipients discriminated by race-they were less likely to help Black callers (53%) than White callers (65%). Three later repetitions of the experiment replicated Gaertner and Bickman's finding (see Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Saucier, Miller, & Doucet, 2005) .
A crucial element of S. L. Gaertner and Bickman's (1971) wrong-number method was that potential helpers could not know that their helping or nonhelping was being monitored. Dozens of later experiments in the 1970s used similar unobtrusive measures to compare the amount of help that Black and White help seekers would receive from White potential helpers. In reviewing the accumulated col lection of more than 30 such studies, Crosby et al. (1980) concluded, "Discriminatory behavior is more prevalent in the . . .; unobtrusive studies than we might expect on the basis of survey data" (p. 557).
Similar results have more recently been found in stud ies of tipping behavior. Obtaining the cooperation of taxi drivers in New Haven, Connecticut, Ayres, Vars, and Zakariya (2005) asked the drivers to keep records of fares and tips. White drivers received tips that were 51% larger than those received by Black drivers, a ratio that was even greater when computed as a percentage of fare. A study of restaurant tipping behavior by Lynn et al. (2006 Lynn et al. ( , 2008 likewise revealed a race difference-White waiters re ceived tips that, on average, were 22% larger than those received by Black waiters.
Hiring and Housing Audits
Many field experiments using audit methods have assessed discrimination in employment and housing. The standard audit method uses paired testers who differ in race or ethnicity while being matched in relevant qualifications such as (for housing audits) income, assets, debt levels, family circumstances, employment history, credit record, and neatness of appearance. Randomizing which of the two members of each pair arrives first, the two testers apply for work or housing to each of a large sample of hiring man agers or real estate agents. This method almost invariably reveals discrimination against Blacks and Hispanics in access to jobs (reviewed by Bendick, 2004) and housing (e.g.. Turner, Ross, Galster & Yinger, 2002) .
Results obtained from field audit experiments strongly suggest that significant acts of discrimination in housing and employment can often occur without expression of hostility toward the people who are disadvantaged by those acts. Some of the individual hiring managers or real estate agents might have been hostile in their denials of consid eration for job interviews or housing. However, the great majority of declinations of hiring and housing applications involve simply the nonoccurrence of a helpful act-either the act of inviting the job seeker for an interview or the act of escorting the housing seeker to view an apartment or home. The greater nonoccurrence of those helpful actions when applicants are Black or Hispanic than when they are White can effectively cause substantial discrimination in housing or hiring 4 Recently, Bendick (2007) and col leagues (Bendick, Rodriguez, & Jayaraman, 2010) , using a method of situation testing in hiring studies, have shown that discrimination in hiring interactions is linked more to occurrences of favorable than of hostile actions.
Policing
Large bodies of data on discrimination in policing have been accumulated in studies of profiling by police in their interactions with pedestrians or with drivers who have been stopped for driving violations or for vehicle maintenance infractions. Discrimination is evident when there is a greater probability of searching or issuing a citation when the driver is Black or Hispanic rather than White and when there is a greater probability of subjecting Black or His panic pedestrians to search (Lamberth, 1994; Spitzer, 1999; Verniero & Zoubek, 1999; Weiss & Rosenbaum, 2009 ).
In summarizing available profiling data. The Leader ship Conference on Civil and Human Rights (2011) con cluded that (a) Blacks and Hispanics were stopped more frequently than Whites; (b) among those stopped, higher proportions of Blacks and Hispanics than Whites received citations; (c) among those stopped, higher proportions of Blacks and Hispanics than Whites were subjected to searches; and (d) among those searched, a smaller propor tion of the searches of Blacks and Hispanics than of Whites yield contraband (e.g., drags or weapons). The loweryields of contraband from searches of Blacks and Hispanics es tablishes that the greater searching of Blacks and Hispanics is not justified by greater criminal activity of Blacks and Hispanics than of Whites among those who are stopped. The greater rate of discovering contraband from searches of vehicles driven by Whites suggests that White drivers are being stopped and searched at inappropriately low rates. This is consistent with the proposition that discrimination reflected in profiling data is in part-perhaps large partdue to favorable acts of either not stopping White drivers or (as the data show) not searching their vehicles after they are stopped.
Public Opinion Surveys
Surveys of White Americans' racial attitudes over the past 50 years show that Whites have steadily increased their support for policies that provide educational or housing opportunities for African Americans. (The finding just mentioned and the other findings described in this para graph are documented in Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997 .) Surveys also have revealed White Americans' in creasing support for racial intermarriage, for equal oppor tunity in employment, and for the acceptability of an Af rican American candidate for U.S. president. At the same time. White Americans' levels of support for policies that provide governmental help to minorities have been largely unchanged during the past half century. In particular, ma jorities of White Americans have steadily opposed financial assistance to minorities, social services to minorities, and affinnative action to benefit minorities in hiring or college admissions. Put differently, national American surveys across the past five decades have found that most White Americans accept basic principles of equal opportunity while, at the same time, resisting the implementation of policies that would increase equality directly by helping outgroups (see also DiTomaso, 2012; Pettigrew, 1979) .
In combination, these evidences of White Americans' current high levels of opposition to both antiminority seg regation policies and prominority assistance policies sug gest that the preferred policies of White Americans amount to a generalized antidiscrimination stance. That is, they favor neither segregation policies that could potentially harm Black Americans nor assistance policies that could potentially favor impoverished Black Americans more than other impoverished Americans. At the same time, there are some government assistance programs that many White Americans do support. As was documented by political opinion polling during the American presidential campaign of 2012, White Americans (more than other demographic categories) supported tax laws that assist very wealthy Americans. Because America's Black and Hispanic minor ities are underrepresented at high income levels, benefits received via tax laws necessarily help Whites more than racial minorities. At the same time, many White Americans are more likely to oppose laws that would disproportion ately benefit relatively impoverished minorities than ones that disproportionately benefit relatively wealthy Whites. Although some of Whites' support for benefits via tax laws can be attributed to economic self-interest, the supported laws often include benefits (such as low income tax rates on the extremely wealthy) that directly affect only Americans much wealthier than many of those laws' supporters.
Theories: Roots of Favoritism
A variety of theories explain conditions that promote and sustain favoritism-not limited to ingroup favoritism. This section describes theoretical accounts of favoritism stated at four levels of psychosocial analysis: intrapersonal, inter personal intergroup, and societal.
Balance Theory and Balanced Identity Theory
In explaining the powerful similarity-attraction phenome non revealed in his research, Byme (1961) proposed that "any time that another person offers us validation by indi cating that his percepts and concepts are congment with ours, it constitutes a rewarding interaction and, hence, one element in forming a positive relationship" (p. 713). Byme advanced this reward theory toward the end of an era in which leaming-reinforcement theories were psychology's dominant theories. By the 1960s, however, those reinforce ment theories were in decline. At that same time, affectivecognitive consistency theories-especially Heider's (1958) balance theory, Osgood and Tannenbaum's (1955) congruity theory, and Festinger's (1957) dissonance theory-were on the ascent in social psychology (see Abelson et al., 1968) .
Although consistency theories themselves declined in the 1970s, they have recently experienced a resurgence (cf. Gawroński & Strack, 2012) . The recent "balanced identity" theory (BIT), which was developed as an extension of Heider's balance theory (Greenwald et al., 2002) , offers a cognitive consistency interpretation of similarity-attrac tion. BIT's balance-congruity principle holds that two concepts that are both associated with the same third con cept will become associated with each other. When a newly encountered person (P) is an ingroup member, both self and P are associated with the ingroup (a third concept) that they share. BIT's balance-congruity principle therefore predicts that the association between selfímá P will strengthen. The same principle then extends to the combination of the new (,self-P) association and the pervasive association of self with positive valence (i.e., self-esteem). When P and pos itive valence are thus both associated with se//" (third con cept), the association between P and positive valence should itself strengthen, theoretically explaining attraction to the ingroup member (P).
Social Identity Theory
Social identity theory (SIT) was developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) in part to account for Tajfel et al.'s (1971) findings of intergroup discrimination in the minimal group paradigm (MPG). In contrast to BIT's association-forma tion interpretation of the relation between self-esteem and ingroup favoritism, SIT offers a motivational interpretation rooted in understanding self-esteem as a motive with the goals of achieving and sustaining positive self-regard. SIT links intergroup discrimination in the MGP to increased self-esteem in two ways: Either (a) a self-esteem increase is achieved as a consequence of perceiving one's own group as superior to the other in the MGP, or (b) approximately the reverse-the motive to elevate self-esteem is the cause of perceiving one's group as superior to the other (Abrams & Hogg, 1988, pp. 320-321) . Hewstone et al. (2002) summarized SIT's self-esteem hypothesis this way: "(1) [Sjuccessful intergroup bias enhances self-esteem and (2) depressed or threatened self-esteem motivates intergroup bias" (p. 41). However, Hewstone et al. also concluded that the evidence for this SIT theorization is at best mixed.
System Justification Theory
If ingroup favoritism is practiced equally by all, then the greatest benefits will necessarily flow to members of a society's more powerful groups. Their greater power, along with their (typically) greater numbers, translates to their being better positioned to benefit from ingroup helpers. System justification theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994) explains how a complementary fonn of favoritism, rooted in existing status, adds to the benefits accruing to liighstatus groups.
Jost and Banaji (1994) defined system justification as a "process by which existing social anangements are legit imized, even at the expense of personal and group interest" (p. 2). There has been substantial empirical support for this theorized reversal of ingroup favoritism for low-status groups, including the prediction that "[a]s system justifica tion tendencies increase . . .; members of low-status groups will exhibit increased outgroup [emphasis added] favorit ism" (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004, p. 901) .
In their review of 10 years of SJT research, Jost et al. (2004) cited substantial evidence for SJT's outgroup favor itism hypothesis. This evidence took the fonn of finding outgroup-favoring attitudes among members of low-status minorities, sometimes assessed with unobtrusive behav ioral indicators (Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002) . Behav ioral evidence for outgroup favoritism was also obtained in some of the unobtrusive-measure studies of helping of the 1970s and in the more recent studies of tipping behavior. Although the first of the unobtrusive helping studies (S. L. Gaertner & Bickman, 1971) found (nonsignificantly) that Blacks helped Whites more than they helped fellow Blacks, subsequent replications did not show that pattern. On the other hand, the two tipping studies-by Ayres et al. (2005) with taxi passengers and by Lynn et al. (2006 Lynn et al. ( , 2008 with restaurant patrons-both found, consistent with SJT's ex pectations, that Black customers gave larger tip percent ages to White than to Black service providers.
When, as theorized in SJT, favoritism thus extends to an advantaged outgroup, the consequence is to exacerbate the relative disadvantage of lower status groups. SJT thus explains an additional source of favoritism that may disproportionately benefit a society's highest status groups. For a high-status group that constitutes a societal minority, this additional source of favoritism might ex ceed ingroup favoritism as a basis for sustaining the group's advantage.
Unrecognized Discrimination and Illusory Individuation
Learning about a person's distinctive characteristics-"in dividuating" that person-is widely understood as a means of overcoming the disadvantaging effects of stereotypes (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Locksley. Borgida, Brekke, & Hepburn, 1980 ). An unfamiliar person whose distinctive characteristics are unknown may be judged, unthinkingly, by applying stereotypes. Logi cally, knowing specific (individuating) characteristics of a person should preempt this use of stereotypes. This plau sible theory notwithstanding, a series of studies conducted over the last 30 years has demonstrated that the expected reduction of stereotyping by individuation is rather easily tluown off track. Instead, stereotypes can insinuate them selves subtly into apparently individuated judgments that can prove disadvantageous to outgroup members. Darley and Gross (1983) found that their college student subjects resisted applying stereotypes to judge the academic skills of a 9-year-old child (Hannah) for whom the only available information made clear that her upbring ing had been in either an impoverished or a well-to-do family enviromnent. Perhaps the research setting put these subjects on alert not to let their knowledge of Hannah's socioeconomic status influence their judgment of her aca demic skills. In two further conditions, subjects addition ally observed a 12-minute videotape of Hannah's responses to 25 "achievement-test" questions. Her performance on these-showing Hannah giving a mixture of correct and incorrect responses-gave no clear impression of Han nah's ability. Nevertheless, findings showed that, in these two individuated conditions, subjects interpreted the added information by applying social class stereotypes. They credited the well-to-do Hannah with having abilities at a higher grade level than the working-class Hannah. Expo sure to the extra (presumably individuating) information apparently licensed subjects to apply stereotypes that they resisted applying when they had no opportunity to observe Hannah's test performances. The process afforded by the videotape plausibly left subjects unaware that their knowl edge of Hannah's socioeconomic status had in any way affected their judgment.
Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, and Rocher (1994) con ducted two experiments inspired by Darley and Gross's (1983) finding. Remarkably, they found similarly that ste reotype-confirming effects occurred even when subjects received no actual individuating information. Instead, they had merely been told that relevant information had been presented to one of their ears, outside of conscious aware ness, in a selective listening ("shadowing") task that re quired repeating an audible message presented to the other ear. Hodson, Dovidio, and Gaertner (2002) constructed a further variation on the use of illusory individuating infor mation. They observed White subjects' evaluations of two presumed college applicants, one White and one Black, whose qualifications differed. Although the two applicants were otherwise matched, one applicant was higher in high school grades and the other was higher on a standardized aptitude test. The two applicants therefore deserved, objec tively, to be treated as approximately equally qualified. Hodson et al.'s noteworthy finding was that, in comparing the White and Black applicants, subjects who scored rela tively high on a measure of prejudice attributed greater predictive weight to the measure on which the White ap plicant was superior. Again, this result reveals discrimina tion in the presence of actually uninformative, but presum ably individuating, information. This discriminatory use of the information was apparent to the experimenters, who could compare the data from different conditions, but the subjects themselves had no basis for suspecting that ste reotypes had influenced their judgments.
Stronger biased-processing findings of the type ob tained by Hodson et al. (2002) were obtained in subsequent studies by Norton, Vandello, and Darley (2004) and by Uhlmann and Cohen (2005) . The biased processing ob served in these studies was labeled variously as hypothesisconfirming bias (Darley & Gross, 1983) , socialjudgeabilitv bias (Yzerbyt et al., 1994) , differential weighting (Hodson et al., 2002) , casuistry (Norton et al., 2004) , and con structed criteria (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2005) . These varia tions in labels notwithstanding, the several studies support each other in demonstrating the readiness with which peo ple "engage in biased behavior while retaining a view of the self as objective" (Norton et al., 2004, p. 828) . In each case the bias started with exposure to information that presumably afforded a basis for objective, individuated judgment but was nevertheless used in a biased fashion. These illusory individuation phenomena relate to this arti cle's main point in showing a subtle fonn of favoritism that can give the benefit of the doubt to an ingroup member. 5
Conformity to Social Norms
Sociologists stress the importance of societal structures in producing intergroup discrimination (DiTomaso, 2012; Pettigrew, 1975; Pettigrew & Taylor, 2002) . An important fonn of this theory is that historical realities such as past slavery and immigrant poverty are inevitably associated with differences in employment and wealth and conse quently with residential segregation. The resulting limita tions of intergroup contact in turn provide a breeding ground for perceived differences that can take the fonn of stereotypes, intergroup tlueat, and wariness, if not outright dislike, of the outgroup (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011) . Justworld reasoning (Lemer, 1980) or "blaming the victim" (Ryan, 1976) can lead to perceiving the impoverished as deserving of their low status, as, in effect, having brought their disadvantages on themselves. In this way, the residue of past discrimination can sustain and even exacerbate discrimination in a "vicious circle" (Myrdal, 1944) .
Sociologists appeal to norms, which are widely shared understandings of what constitutes acceptable social behav ior. Both fonnál nonns (e.g., a posted 65-miles-per-hour [mph] automobile speed limit) and infonnal nonns (keep ing to the right if driving below the speed limit) powerfully guide behavior (Pettigrew, 1991 (Pettigrew, , 2011 . Also important are rewards and punishments that may independently shape the nonns (e.g., an enforced 75-mph limit on a highway with a posted 65-mph limit). Nonns shape intergroup interaction and provide a coimnon meaning to all participants in the interaction.
Moreover, discriminatory nonns are typically cumu lative. That is, discriminatory nonns build on themselves and tend to reinforce each other across societal realms. Thus, America's extreme residential segregation by race shaped and continues to maintain racial discrimination in employment, schools, home mortgages, and civic services generally (Pettigrew, 1975; Pettigrew & Taylor, 2002) . Nonns are also self-perpetuating. They come in time to be unquestioned, to be accepted simply because "that's just the way tilings are done" (Pettigrew, 1991 (Pettigrew, , 1998 .
The persistence of nonns means that their discrimina tory effects can outlive the initiating past causes of dis criminatory practices. Those who initiated the nonns may have been motivated by hostile prejudice; but later gener ations can adhere to nonns that benefit their ingroup with out harboring the animosity felt by the nonns' creators. The result is that nonns are likely to remain unchanged even while attitudes are shifting markedly. At present, in the midst of rapid fonnál change in intergroup relations in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and the southern United States, old nonns are slowly receding while new equalitarian nonns have yet to develop fully. In all three societies, reticence and awkwardness characterize intergroup inter action, often accompanied by intergroup avoidance and infonnal discrimination that occurs without hostile intent (see especially Dovidio and Gaertner's analyses of aversive racism-e.g.. Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; also Pettigrew, 1991 also Pettigrew, , 2011 .
Nonns can be so unquestioned that people think and behave in conflicting ways in different social contexts while remaining unaware of the inconsistency. At an Indi ana steel mill in the 1950s, Blacks and Whites were mem bers of the same racially desegregated union and worked well together (Reitzes, 1953 ; for a similar example, see Minard, 1952) . Only 12% of the White workers reported low acceptance of African Americans on the job. Those most involved in the union were the strongest supporters of the union's pro-desegregation nonns. Yet these same White workers also lived in racially segregated, all-White neighborhoods, and many belonged to activist pro-segregation neighborhood groups. Indeed, 84% of those who accepted African Americans at work were highly resistant to Blacks living in their neighborhoods. Those most in volved with their neighborhoods were the most resistant to having Blacks as neighbors. The behavior in each setting favored the setting's prominent ingroup-union solidarity at work, racial solidarity at home. considered conformity an essential concept for understanding prejudice, devoting a full chap ter of his classic volume to the subject. In a later article. Allport (1962) wrote, "Conformity is the missing link that explains why and how societal forces eventuate into pat terns of acceptance or discrimination" (p. 132). Thus, con formity research also supports our thesis. Relatively un prejudiced Americans typically follow their ingroup's nonns. If, as is typical, these nonns demand preferential treatment of the ingroup, most people-like the Indiana steel workers-will confonn without personal animus to ward the outgroup.
Method Limitations
Discrimination lias been investigated with a wide range of measures, including behavioral interactions (overt and non verbal), behavioral intentions, interpersonal judgments, self-reported attitudes, and implicit attitudes-all of which we consider in this section. We will explain why most research procedures used in studies of prejudice are inad equate to distinguish ingroup favoritism from outgroup hostility as mechanisms of discrimination. The conse quence is that relatively few studies provide data optimal for evaluating the role of ingroup favoritism in discrimina tion.
To distinguish ingroup favoritism from outgroup hos tility as a cause of discrimination, a study must meet two requirements. First, the study's measures must distinguish favorableness from hostility in thoughts, feelings, or be havior toward others. To do this, a measure must have an unambiguous neutral point-a value that is neither favor able nor hostile. Second, the study must use a design that pennits comparison between behavior toward ingroup members and behavior toward outgroup members. The first requirement is needed to distinguish favorable from hostile behavior. The second requirement is needed to assess whether discrimination lias occuned. Only a small fraction of the many existing studies of intergroup behavior meet even one of these two criteria, and many lack both. Most of this section analyzes methods regarding the first require ment. Shortcomings regarding the second requirement are more easily and briefly described at the end of this section.
Overt Behavior Measures
Numerous experiments have investigated discrimination by using unobtrusive assessments of overt helping behavior (see the reviews by Crosby et al., 1980, and Saucier et al., 2005) . These studies succeeded in unambiguously identi fying favorable behavior by scoring subjects simply as helping or as not helping (inaction). Inaction is neutral behavior, and helping is positive. The studies have no hostile behavior option.
Given the widespread understanding of prejudice as hostile behavior, one might expect that there must be many studies in which discrimination has been observed in the fonn of overtly hostile behavior toward members of an outgroup. In searching, we could find just seven laboratory studies in which discrimination was assessed using mea sures that appeared unambiguously to involve outgroupdirected hostile behavior. The behaviors were electric shock administration in six (Baron, 1979; Donnerstein, Donnerstein, Simon, & Ditrichs, 1972; Gentlmer & Taylor, 1973; Griffin & Rogers, 1977; Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1980; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1981; Wilson & Rogers, 1975) and aversive noise administration in the seventh (Mummendey et al., 1992) . The shock administration stud ies incorporated electric shock either as an outcome to be administered to another player in a competitive game or as an experimental stimulus to be presented for the ostensible рифове of increasing another subject's heart rate. In most conditions of these studies. White subjects administered more shocks to Whites (i.e., to presumed ingroup mem bers) than to Blacks. 6 Experimenters interpreted this in terms of egalitarian nonns and concerns about appearing prejudiced. In only one condition of one of these experi ments did White subjects administer more shocks to an other presumed subject who was Black than to one who was White. Contrary to researchers' expectations, both in experiments with aversive shock and experiments with aversive noise stimuli, fairness (i.e., ingroup and outgroup receiving the same outcomes) prevailed in distributing the aversive outcomes. Accordingly, no evidence of outgroup hostility has been reported in experiments using unambig uously aversive stimuli.
A famous early field experiment on prejudice also found no evidence for discrimination in a situation in which had discrimination occurred, it would have had to take an overtly hostile fonn. LaPiere (1934) and two Chinese trav eling companions toured the southwestern United States, seeking housing and dining accommodations at 251 estab lishments. Face-to-face denial of service to potential cus tomers is undeniably a hostile act. LaPiere and the Chinese couple were refused service only once in their 251 requests. This result was in stark contrast with the finding that, in response to a subsequent mailed questionnaire, more than 90% of these same establishments reported that they would not accoimnodate "members of the Chinese race."
Nonverbal Behavior Measures
One might expect that nonverbal measures, such as facial expressions, body orientation, and voice tone, can easily be classified into positive and negative categories. However, nonverbal measures rarely afford a clear neutral point. As one example, when the subject can position his or her chair at variable distances from a fellow participant, even though smaller distance translates unambiguously to greater positivity toward the other participant (cf. Amodio & Devine, 2006) , it is not possible to identify a specific distance that can be scored as "neutral." Measures of speaking time are similarly unambiguous in direction (more conversation is more favorable) but equally lack specifiable neutral values. Likewise, when measures of facial affect are being ob tained (cf. McConnell & Leibold, 2001) , it is difficult to score them so as to identify a neutral point. Problems come in combining multiple responses for a subject. Clearly, smiles cannot all be counted as equally positive nor frowns as equally negative, and some of each might even be intended to convey the opposite. 7
Behavioral Intention Measures
The procedure introduced by Tajfel et al. (1971) identifies an unambiguous neutral point when the measures involve distribution of payments to others. Neutral behavior takes the fonn of allocating a payment equal to the per-person average of available points or funds. Favoring (positive) and disfavoring (negative) behavior then takes the fonn of payment that falls, respectively, above or below that aver age level. LaPiere's (1934) mailed questionnaire provides another illustration of a behavioral intention measurewillingness or refusal to accept Chinese guests-that could be scored unambiguously as positive or negative. 8
Interpersonal Judgment Measures
Consider the judgment task of recommending a jail sen tence for a convicted defendant for whom the available evidence indicates both guilt and mitigating circumstances. If the permissible sentence range is from a low of 6 months to a high of 5 years, it is clear that the shortest sentence is favorable and the longest sentence is unfavorable. But how can one identify an intermediate sentence term that is neutral-neither favorable nor hostile to the defendant? Furthermore, if the dependent measure is obtained as (say) a 7-point Likert-fonnat judgment of endorsement of the maximum sentence, what level of agreement can be as sumed to be neither favorable nor unfavorable to the de fendant? This limitation can be overcome by providing the subject with information about an average sentence for the defendant's circumstances, then requesting endorsement of either a shorter, equal, or longer sentence.
Self-Report Attitude Measures
Self-report attitude measures are easily constmcted with neutral points, as with thermometer scales that have end anchors of warm (positive) and cold (negative) and a mid dle anchor of neutral. A useful alternative recommended by S. L. Gaertner et al. (1997) is to have separate rating 6 Although the Black subjects of the Wilson and Rogers (1975) experiment chose higher intensity shocks to administer to (outgroup) White than to (ingroup) Black confederates, the product of intensity and shock duration measures revealed that they had chosen somewhat greater shocks for Black (ingroup) confederates. 7 The difficulty of characterizing nonverbal intergroup behavior un ambiguously as positive or negative can be seen in some innovative studies in field settings that have demonstrated discrimination based on sexual orientation (Hebl, Foster, Mannix, & Dovidio, 2002) and obesity (King, Spiro, Hebl, Singletary, & Turner, 2006) . 8 In the context of assessing favoritism, behavioral intention mea sures compare interestingly with overt behavior measures. Crosby et al. (1980) found that outgroup-directed helping was greater when White potential helpers were in face-to-face interactions with Black potential help recipients, compared to "remote" situations in which the two were not face to face. Whites' opposition to helping minorities, expressed on surveys, may be an analog of the low rate of helping found in the remote conditions of the unobtrusive-measure helping studies reviewed by Crosby et al. scales for positive and negative traits, with the low anchor indicating absence of the trait. Using this method, S. L. Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983) and Dovidio et al. (1989) found that White subjects did not discriminate against Blacks on negative-trait scales; they rated Whites and Blacks equally on these. In contrast, they did discriminate on positive-trait scales (rating Whites higher than Blacks). This strong finding (subsequently replicated in several Western European countries by Meertens, 1995, and Pettigrew, 1997) reveals discrimi natory judgment in the fonn of favoring the ingroup rather than disfavoring the outgroup.
Implicit Attitude Measures
For the most widely used implicit attitude measures, sub jects make rapid classification responses to both valenced word stimuli and to images, words, or names that represent two contrasted categories, which can be an ingroup and outgroup, such as White and Black. These implicit mea sures generate relative-attitude scores that index greater favorability to one group than to the other (e.g., Fazio, Sanbomnatsu, Powell & Kardės, 1986; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998) . These measures often reveal evaluative separation between the two groups, but they do not unambiguously locate either group relative to a neutral point (i.e., a score that indicates neither positive nor neg ative evaluation). Some implicit measures may do a better job than others in distinguishing favorability from unfavorability in an absolute sense (e.g.. Nosek & Banaji, 2001; Sriram & Greenwald, 2009 ), but even these measures are not established as having neutral zero points. Their zero points more confidently indicate indifference between the groups, which could mean that both groups are regarded equally positively or that they are regarded equally nega tively.
The "Second Requirement"
Our analysis of method lias to this point considered only the first requirement that we stated, which is to use mea sures of behavior or judgment that have an unambiguous neutral point. The second requirement is that the study must demonstrate discrimination by comparing behavior or judgments toward ingroup members versus outgroup mem bers. To meet the second requirement at the individualsubject level requires a within-subjects design in which each subject provides a measure for both ingroup and outgroup. Designs in which ingroup versus outgroup is a between-subjects factor also pennit assessment of discrim ination, but not for individual subjects. For either type of design, detennination of whether discrimination takes the fonn of ingroup favoritism or outgroup hostility is possible only if the first requirement (neutral point of dependent measure) is also met. The minimal group paradigm and studies that use unobtrusive measures of helping are the rare paradigms for which more than an occasional study meets both the neutral-point requirement and the ingroupoutgroup comparison requirement.
Three Conclusions About Methods
Methods Used in Most Studies of Discrimination Have Limited Capabilities
Few studies in the voluminous research literature on prej udice and discrimination have used methods that can dis tinguish the relative roles of ingroup-favorable and outgroup-hostile behavior in producing discrimination. This could well be a consequence of the widespread (but, to us, incorrect) belief that discrimination most often occurs in the fonn of outgroup-directed hostility. When one makes this assumption, it might well appear unnecessary to inves tigate relative contributions of favoritism and hostility to discrimination. Most studies of discrimination address one of two other questions: (a) detennining whether various experimental manipulations increase or reduce discrimina tion or (b) detennining whether various individual-difference measures of prejudice successfully predict individual differences in discriminatory behavior. These aims do not require either of the two criteria for detennining whether observed discrimination lias resulted from ingroup favorit ism or outgroup hostility.
It is remarkable that relatively few studies have used dependent measures that assessed unequivocally hostile behavior. This paucity cannot be explained simply in tenns of experimenters' benevolence, because a paradigm involv ing aggression via (presumed) administration of electric shocks was widely used in the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Buss & Brock, 1963) . The use of this well-known method in only six studies of race discrimination, during the same era in which more than 30 studies had investigated race discrim ination in unobtrusive helping (Crosby et al. 1980) , sug gests that it may be much easier to observe discrimination in studies using unobtrusive measures of helping behavior than in studies that observe shock administration or other unequivocally hostile behavior.
Balance of Findings With Existing Methods
More studies have demonstrated discrimination resulting from ingroup favoritism than from outgroup hostility-an unexpected observation in light of the prevailing wisdom that discrimination typically occurs in the fonn of hostility directed toward outgroups. For whatever reason, it is ap parently easier to demonstrate discrimination in the fonn of differential favoritism than in the fonn of differential hos tility. The most parsimonious and plausible explanation is that, indeed, discrimination more often takes the fonn of ingroup favoritism than outgroup hostility. However, some portion of this imbalance in findings may also be due to the greater ease of meeting ethical research standards in labo ratory studies that use measures of benign behavior than in ones investigating hostile behavior.
New Methods Are Needed
Prejudice researchers need to add methods to their toolboxesmethods that (a) distinguish ingroup-favorable from outgroup-hostile subject behavior, (b) provide a comparison of outcomes to ingroup and outgroup members, and (c) are easy to administer in standardized fonn. Among existing laboratory methods, L. Gaertner and Insko's (2001) multi ple alternative matrices procedure for the minimal group paradigm comes closest to meeting this combination of requirements but is not adapted to investigating face-toface intergroup interactions. The most important method recommendation is to use measures-whether nonverbal, behavioral, self-report, or implicit-that have unambigu ous neutral points that enable distinguishing between fa voring and hostile responses.
Discussion
We conclude that ingroup favoritism is currently more potent than outgroup hostility as a cause of intergroup discrimination in the United States. The support for tins conclusion comes from multiple, well-established empiri cal paradigms, including laboratory studies of minimal group and similarity-attraction paradigms, field experi ments using unobtrusive observations of helping behavior, and field audit studies of police profiling and of treatment accorded to potential job seekers, apartment renters, and home buyers.
Two caveats to our conclusion are necessitated by the available research literature. First, many of the studies we cited involved race. It is conceivable that outgroup hostility may play a greater role in nomacial discrimination than in racial discrimination. Second, most of the studies we re viewed were conducted in the United States. Although conclusions based on these studies may also hold in other nations, it is premature to assume that the same will be found elsewhere-especially in locations such as Northern Ireland and South Africa, which have centuries-old histo ries of intergroup hostility and discrimination. Tests of the ingroup favoritism thesis in those countries should be highly infonnative. Pending broader investigations in other countries and with other fonns of discrimination, our con clusion that ingroup favoritism enables discrimination should be regarded as most strongly established for Black-White racial discrimination in the United States.
The Nature of the Evidence
An obvious question prompted by our main conclusion is: Why is the "ingroup favoritism enables discrimination" thesis not already generally accepted as a prime explana tion of discrimination? If the evidence is so extensive and most of it has been available for at least a few decades, why have students of prejudice and discrimination not previ ously arrived at this conclusion? The answer has two parts. The more important part is that, throughout the history of prejudice's scientific study, most researchers have defined and understood prejudice as an affectively negative outgroup-directed attitude that they expect to result in hostile acts of discrimination. That view was justified for a long time but is now questionable given the societal transfor mations that have cumulatively produced dramatic reduc tions in both endorsements of negative attitudes toward minority groups and in hostile fonns of discrimination. The second part is that-as explained in this article's analysis of research methods-very few empirical studies of discrim ination have used methods that can evaluate the relative contributions of ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility to observed discrimination.
Our conclusion about limitations of research methods raises a second question: If methods to evaluate relative contributions of ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility are so inadequate, how can we reach a strong conclusion about those relative contributions? Our strategy in this article was to build our case by establishing three points. First, ingroup-directed positivity is pervasive, and there is no comparable evidence for an equivalent pervasiveness of outgroup-directed negativity. Second, discrimination fre quently occurs in the fonn of differential favoring, and there is no comparable evidence for discrimination occur ring so frequently in the fonn of differential hanning. Third, established theories offer multiple bases for under standing the development of positive regard for others-a point to which we next turn.
Multiplicity of Explanations for Ingroup Favoritism
Societal factors . . .; are distal causal factors in group relations . . . .; At the same time, the intervening factor of personality is ever the proximal cause of human conduct....; There are no good reasons for professional rivalry and backbiting among social scientists preferring one approach or Hie other. They can and should be blended in our outlook. (Allport, 1962, p. 132) This review has sought to establish that multiple theories, at both individual and societal levels, can explain the strength of ingroup favoritism. Allport's (1962) observa tion about the synergy of theories applies not only to theories that fall on different sides of the disciplinary boundary between psychology and sociology but equally to the sets of theories within each of those disciplines. Fur thermore, the various theories most often do not conflict in their explanations. Rather, they offer multiple, comple mentary theoretical routes to the goal of understanding ingroup favoritism. Our focus on ingroup favoritism there fore affords a rapprochement among social psychology's person-centered explanations and the other social sciences' social-structure-centered explanations.
We do not claim that hostile prejudice plays no role in discrimination. However, we do claim that much discrim ination occurs without hostile intent; it occurs either as a consequence of social structures (such as the self-sustain ing properties of segregation in schools, homes, work places, and institutional discrimination) or as a conse quence of mental processes that lack animus (such as nonns, similarity-attraction, and the judgment processes that we labeled illusory individuation).
A coimnon denominator in these discrimination-pro ducing societal and mental processes is that, without en gaging outgroup-directed hostility, they all tend to result in favoring already advantaged groups. In this way, discrim inatory outcomes will often occur without the intergroup animus that, traditionally, has been a defining feature of prejudice. We do not suggest that prejudice should there fore be reconceived without reference to hostility. That would be too radical a conclusion from our observations. especially because we are not inclined to claim that it has always been thus. The important, and perhaps no less radical, conclusion is that in contemporary American soci ety intergroup discrimination has a potent life that now can occur without intergroup hostility.
Has There Been a Decline of Malice?
Although much societally significant discrimination con tinues to occur in hostile fonns, it is even more apparent that hostile acts of race discrimination in the United States have steadily declined during the past century. Perhaps the most dramatic indication of decline is evident in data concerning lynchings. Lynchings-which were group kill ings of (mostly) Black Americans-declined from an av erage of 150 per year in the late 19th century to their disappearance in the 1950s ("4,733 Mob Action Victims Since '82, Tuskegee Reports", 1962) . A second compelling source of evidence is much more recent: In 1996, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) started compiling data on hate crimes. 9 Hate crimes targeting Black victims declined steadily from an average of 4,071 per year in 1996-1998 to 2,762 per year in 2009-2011. As percent ages of the U.S. Black population in 2000 and 2010, the percentages of Blacks who were victims of hate crimes had declined (between 1999-2001 and 2009-2011) by a third, from 0.030% to 0.020%.
Implications
Our strong conclusion is that, in present-day America, discrimination results more from helping ingroup members than from hanning outgroup members. This conclusion has substantial implications for the conduct of research on discrimination, for teaching about prejudice and discrimi nation, and for the design of programs to reduce discrim ination. Because the implications for research and teaching both follow from the potential importance of the conclusion for practical application, this section focuses on the impli cations for practice.
Our conclusion adds force to the approach of S. L. Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) , who emphasized the possible discrimination-reducing impact of forming "superordinate" identities, which extend ingroup boundaries and thereby increase the diversity of others who are encompassed within the ingroup fold. Our conclusion also suggests a quite different approach to discrimination reduction: adopt ing policies of targeted outgroup helping, in effect seeking to level the ingroup-favoritism playing field. This sugges tion fits with affirmative action strategies that aim to in crease benefits for disadvantaged minorities or for groups regarded as underrepresented in workplaces and selective educational institutions. Relatedly, DiTomaso (2012) ob served that resistance to affirmative action programs has at least a partial explanation in affirmative action's disruption of routine fonns of ingroup favoritism, which include seek ing friends to fill job vacancies and admitting "legacy" applicants to elite educational institutions.
In regard to employment discrimination, the courts provide opportunities for discrimination reduction that de pend not on intergroup attitudes and behavior but on judges' interpretations of law. It is therefore relevant to ask whether establishment of the potency of ingroup favoritism as a source of discrimination might affect efforts to reduce discrimination via litigation. Krieger (1998) pointed out that federal courts' interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 largely disallowed the argument that plaintiff employees in protected classes were adversely impacted by ingroup favoritism that benefited others.
By way of contrast with the situation when Krieger was writing in 1998, a 2012 federal court decision allowed a case to proceed, based on an ingroup favoritism theory of discrimination. If the 2012 decision presages a future legal enviromnent in which discrimination suits appealing to ingroup favoritism will generally be allowed to proceed, this article's conclusions may prove useful to the courts deciding those cases. 10 A provocative recent article by Dixon et al. (2012) started, as we did, by observing that current conceptions may incorrectly link discrimination primarily to negative intergroup attitudes. Dixon et al. proceeded to conclude that collective political action by historically disadvantaged groups might be more efficacious in ending discrimination than efforts directed at increasing positivity toward out groups. 11 In closing, we must counter any impression that we regard favoritism as the only cause of discrimination wor thy of scholarly attention. Although hostile fonns of dis crimination have declined steadily during the period in which prejudice lias been studied scientifically, hostile dis crimination nevertheless continues to exist in many fonns, including racial and ethnic slurs, hostile work environ ments, hate crimes, and tenorism. At the same time, legal, ethical, and nonnative constraints against hostile discrim ination now widely prevail in the United States, and there are few parallel constraints against the multiple fonns of favoritism that can generate discrimination. As ethnic and racial minorities become increasingly represented in Amer ican work settings, it is even plausible that opportunities for favoritism to produce significant discrimination are in creasing.
9 Annual counts of multiple categories of hate crimes for 1996 through 2011 are available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hatecrime. 10 The contrast of two federal court opinions in 1993 and 2012 signals a change of direction regarding ingroup favoritism. The 1993 opinion, in the case of E.E.O.C. v. Consolidated Service Systems, declared that if a hiring policy "produce [s] a work force whose racial or religious or ethnic or nation-origin or gender composition pleases the employer, this is not intentional discrimination. The motive is not a discriminatory one." The 2012 opinion, in the case of McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, concluded that the defendant company might have discriminated by allowing a form of company-wide ingroup favoritism involving teams of brokers who could choose to exclude African American brokers: "The teams . . .; are little fraternities [in which] the brokers choose as team members people who are like themselves. If they are white, they, or some of them anyway, are more comfortable teaming with other white brokers." Especially noteworthy regarding the contrast between these two opinions is that they were written by the same federal judge. 11 See chapter 11 of Pettigrew and Tropp (2011) for an additional view on the conclusions reached by Dixon et al. (2012) . a favorable or unfavorable predisposition toward any member of the category in question" an emotional, rigid attitude (a predisposition to respond to a certain stimulus in a certain way) toward a group of people" a hostile or negative attitude toward a distinguishable group based on generalizations derived from faulty or incomplete information" an unjustified negative attitude towards an individual based solely on that individual's membership in a group" negative attitudes toward members of social groups" a negative attitude that is considered to be unjustified by an observer" a social emotion experienced with respect to one's social identity as a group member, with an outgroup as a target" negative evaluations of social groups" negative affect directed toward all members of a specific social category" negative evaluations toward the outgroup" negative attitude that is based on another person's membership in a social group" the holding of derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative affect or the display of hostile or discriminatory behaviour towards members of a group on account of their membership of that group" an unjustifiable (and usually negative) attitude toward a group and its members [involving] stereotyped beliefs, negative feelings, and a predisposition to discriminatory action" a positive or negative evaluation of a social group and its members" an antipathy, felt or expressed, based upon a faulty generalization and directed toward a group as a whole or toward individual members of a group" a negative attitude directed toward people simply because they are members of a specific social group" a negative feeling or attitude toward the members of a group" an evaluation (positive or negative) [and] a biased perception of a group . . based on the real or imagined characteristics of the group" the relative devaluation in specific role contexts of members of a particular group compared to equivalent members of other groups" a hostile or negative attitude toward people in a distinguishable group, based solely on their membership in that group"
